I would like to link the internal situation in Sudan

to its international terrorism, because what is going on inside

Sudan amounts to terrorism against the Sudanese people by the

NIF Government. But, first, I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I

have been coming up before this committee and the comparable

committee in the other body for the last 8 years, and working in

Sudan for the last 16 years. I started out as one of these neutral

humanitarian types that was seeking to bind up the wounds of

those people who were being victimized by conflict in Sudan.

But I must say at this point in time I have very strong views

about the fact that we should not be talking about containing what

is happening at the hand of the Government of Sudan. We should

be talking about eliminating the Government of Sudan. As it

stands now, it is in the interests of the United States, it is in the

interests of the Sudanese people, it is in the interests of the regional

States contiguous to Sudan, that the administration which

has shown this track record of both international and internal terrorism

no longer be in a position to be recognized as a sovereign

government.

And I am here to tell you today that amongst all the States that

are the participants in this international terrorism network or matrix,

this is the one State in which the possibility of fundamental

change exists, and that is why I would like to link my comments

to the internal dynamics of Sudan.

First of all, let me say my views are strong, because I was exceedingly

involved in Sudan at the time this government came to

power. Keep in mind they overthrew a democratically elected government.

Since then, there has been no true participatory politics

in Sudan. There are no parties that really function as parties.

When we talk, as a number of people have done earlier today,

about a million and a half people dead because of the actions of

this government and the war that it has carried forth, you need to

understand, that a million and a half is a heck of a lot larger number

than the number of dead from Zaire, from Bosnia, from Somalia

all put together.

This is a human tragedy of a massive dimension. It is hard to

imagine what 2 or 3 million internally displaced and war-affected

people look like in south Sudan, but if you understand there are

only 4 or 5 million of them there, so you are talking about 50 percent

of the total population of south Sudan having been war-affected

and displaced. It is a very dramatic impact that we are talking

about.

The massive human rights abuses of this government have been

documented by my colleagues in the human rights sector as clearly

as could possibly be the case. Once it came to power, it purged the

universities, it purged the intellectuals, it purged the labor unions,

it purged the military, it eliminated a free press.

Government forces have engaged in religious persecution. I

should point out not only the burning of Christian churches, but

they are not averse to destroying mosques in certain parts of the

country, such as the Nuba Mountains, because they believe that

the people who worship in those mosques do not represent the

right brand of Islam.

But what we have in particular in south Sudan is the loss of an

entire way of life, the loss of an entire generation of young people.

There is no possibility of restoring the lost education which has

produced people who know nothing about how to function, other

than by taking up arms to defend themselves, because that is what

they have had to do.

This government has consistently manipulated the humanitarian

relief efforts of the United Nations through Operation Lifeline

Sudan. It has consistently bombed civilian populations, because it

has a very tough time locating military targets of the SPLA.

What they do is, they fly over in Antonovs, little two-prop jobs,

with bombs, and they roll them out the back door. They roll them

out on the only identifiable targets they have, which are almost

never military. They are markets, or they are camps of internally

displaced people. Those are the bulk of the casualties that you get

at the hands of this particular government.

You may not know that they even bombed, on April 20 of this

year, the town of Yei, while American Secret Service personnel

were on the ground advancing what was expected to be a meeting

between former President Carter and the head of the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement, Dr. John Garang. Carter was going

there on a mission of peace.

The Government of Khartoum knew that, and their response was

to bomb the town.

I think all of these things, both the international terrorism that

we discussed previously and this internal terrorism that I am talking

about, are linked to the NIF agenda. They are linked to the

NIF agenda, which is to Islamize and Arabize not only Sudan but

also the region.

The mission as I believe it is seen in Khartoum, when it comes

to the regional States, is to eliminate, to destabilize those States

in the region that are pro-American, secular governments. They

have problems with the pro-American presence. They have problems

with the secular presence, and their focus on Eritrea, their

focus on Ethiopia, and their focus on Uganda are very conscious.

Let me just give you one example. The Government of Khartoum

documentedly supports what is called the Lord’s Resistance Army

in Northern Uganda. Now, the Lord’s Resistance Army is sometimes

referred to as an extremist Christian sect. It is not any variety

of Christianity I know, because their program amounts basically

to violence against civilians, civilians that are following the

Government of Uganda in terms of trying to reconstruct and promote

development in that society.

The LRA does not have a political program. They engage in gratuitous

violence like cutting off people’s noses, cutting off people’s

lips. You should see those people. That is the kind of regional terrorism

that this government that we are talking about has promoted.

In my view, the threat that it represents to our allies in the region,

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, is a direct threat to U.S. interests,

and we ought to be responding accordingly.

Now, I said before that I think there is a little bit of good news

here, despite the fact that the State Department did not seem to

recognize it earlier, and that is that Sudan is the one State that

is highly vulnerable within the international terrorist complex.

Iran is tough. Iraq is tough. Libya is tough. A lot of these guys

are tough. Sudan is not so tough, and the reason it is not so tough

is there is a massive effective internal opposition to this government.

There is armed warfare against this government that is occurring

day by day by day, and it is succeeding on the ground.

The opposition is not just the Christian and animist south. It is

a coalition of forces under the umbrella of the National Democratic

Alliance that involves traditional Muslim leadership, a variety of

Muslim elements from the north in league with the Sudan People’s

Liberation Army in the south, and over the last year-and-a-half or

so the tide has definitely turned in the favor of these forces.

There are now four military fronts in Sudan. There is a national

Democratic Alliance Front, the so-called ‘‘Eastern Front’’ which is

between Port Sudan and Khartoum, which is the most strategic

part of Sudan that you can imagine, because all of Khartoum’s supplies

come through Port Sudan. The economy of Sudan is based on

transiting that territory, and their oil supplies and petrol and all

of that are based on that.

There is a front further south in Upper Nile and southern Blue

Nile Province in the area of the dam at Damizine, which provides

80 percent of the power supply for Khartoum.

There is the front that the SPLA operates in the Nuba mountains,

where ethnic cleansing or cultural cleansing is going on at

the hands of this government, and there is the major front in the

south.

I visited Yei, which fell to the SPLA about 8 or so weeks ago, just

last week, and all of the garrison towns between Yei and the Ugandan

border have all recently been taken by the opposition. The

SPLA has eliminated the West Nile Bank Front, which is one of

the terrorist organizations functioning within Uganda.

What I am trying to tell you, Mr. Chairman, is that these four

fronts and this combined capacity of the Sudan People’s Liberation

Army and the National Democratic Alliance colleague forces represent

a significant threat to the survival of this government; and

that being the case, it seems to me the possibility of talking about

not containing but making a fundamental change in Sudan is realistically

on the table.

We do not need Americans to do this. We do not need American

hardware to do this. There is a strong capacity inside Sudan to do

this. My view is that what we ought to do are the following three

things.

First of all, it is my view that we need to support that internal

opposition, to support the victims, the humanitarian victims of the

war in Sudan, and we need to support our allies in the region.

First of all, we need a clear policy. We do not have a clear policy,

Mr. Chairman. The U.S. Government does not have a clear policy

on Sudan.

Sudan in my view is an enemy State. It backed Saddam Hussein

in the Desert Storm war. It is engaged in the terrorism that we

talked about on the international level. It has engaged in the terrorism

I talked about on the internal level, but we continue to send

ambiguous kinds of signals about how we are dealing with Sudan.

We talk about changing their behavior. Not likely, sir. As I said,

I have been testifying before this committee for at least 8 years,

and I have seen how they change their behavior and how they

change it back when it suits them, after we stop looking seriously

at them, and that has happened on any number of occasions.

What must they do more than has already been acknowledged in

this hearing for us to begin to view them as an enemy State worthy

of our specific support to their opposition?

Second, we need to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of

civilians in the south of Sudan. I mentioned the areas I visited last

week. These are areas that, now that they are free of the heavyhanded

Government of Sudan, thousands, 75,000 to 100,000 refuges

that were formerly outside the country are returning.

There is no food up there. This whole area is war-affected. For

refugees who are returning there will be months before they can

produce a crop. There is no food there now. People are living off

mangoes out of the trees, and that mango diet really does not suffice.

But what we see, I tell you frankly, from the Sudan field office

of USAID that handles this area, based in Nairobi, is a lack of energy

and a lack of creativity. For example, that office has drawn

physical lines in the sand above which it will not supply humanitarian

assistance, and these lines fall far short of where these returning

refugees would like to go home to begin to start their life

again, to begin to become productive and independent.

There is a lack of energy and a lack of creativity in USAID on

this, and Operation Lifeline Sudan, which somebody earlier referred

to as a unique effort to try to meet the needs of civilians regardless

of what war sector they were found in is something that

the Government in Khartoum long ago cutoff at the knees and manipulates

regularly.

So, for example, this Operation Lifeline Sudan, which our Government

provides resources to, is barred by the Government in

Khartoum from assisting civilians every time there is a fight in a

location and the territory winds up in the hands of the SPLA.

So in Yei there are hospitals filled with war-wounded and other

desperate kinds of civilians. There is no food assistance up there

or medical assistance provided by the OLS, because the Government

of Khartoum does not allow it. We need to meet those needs.

There are ways to do that.

Third, last year in the report on the foreign operations appropriation,

the Congress—you spoke of one kind of intent earlier. There

was another intent stated fairly clearly, I think, in the report on

the foreign ops appropriation. Basically what it did was, in both

the area of disaster assistance and in the area more particularly

of development assistance it says, ‘‘the committee authorizes AID

to use development and disaster assistance funds for capacity

building purposes in areas of south Sudan outside the control of

the Government of Sudan.’’

The clear interest of the Congress was to begin to draw lines in

the sand that demonstrated that the American people and the

American Government recognized the threat that the Government

in Khartoum represents, and to begin to concretely side with its opposition

and with its victims and with our own regional allies. That

frankly, in my view, is what we should do.

I believe there is a convergence of interest on the part of the

United States, on the part of our regional allies, and on the part

of the Sudanese people to have that government no longer be the

Government of Sudan.

Thank you.

I am Roger Winter, director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Thank you for

conducting this hearing on ‘‘Terrorism and Sudan’’ and for inviting me to testify.

Senator Ashcroft, I know this is the first hearing on Africa under your leadership

as Chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee. I and the U.S. Committee for Refugees

staff will always be available to provide you and your colleagues continued

information, analysis, and policy recommendations on conflict and humanitarian

concerns in Africa.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization

that regularly monitors and assesses the plight of refugees and displaced people

around the world. We have defended the rights of refugees, displaced, and waraffected

people for 39 years. To do that seriously, we regularly go on site in the

midst of war and conflict situations, documenting conditions, analyzing the political

environment, and offering informed policy recommendations. I am pleased to have

an opportunity to offer my perspective on Sudan at this hearing.

Linking Sudan’s International and Domestic Terrorism

Mr. Chairman, I returned three days ago from my most recent site visit to southern

Sudan. I met in the field with the leaders of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement (SPLM). I visited several locations in the south, including Yei, Maridi,

and Kaya. I also spent time in Uganda, which has hosted large numbers of Sudanese

refugees, has been bombed by Sudanese military planes, and has suffered egregious

rebel attacks supported by the regime in Khartoum.

As this testimony makes clear, I have strong views regarding the conflict in

Sudan and the role of the extremist National Islamic Front (NIF) government there.

I did not start out with such strong views. I work for a humanitarian agency, and

that orientation is the story of my professional life. However, I have become particularly

engaged on Sudan over the years by the needs of the victims of conflict, and

I have seen that the destructive agenda pursued by the Government of Sudan has

tragic consequences:

· More civilians have died unnecessarily in Sudan than all the casualties of Somalia,

Zaire, and Bosnia combined—about 1.5 million during the last decade.

African Sudanese have the status of 4th class citizens in their own country.

They have endured constant bombing of civilian concentrations in the south—

mostly markets and displaced persons camps.

· The education of a whole generation of southern Sudanese, and many northerners

too, has been lost.

· Literally millions of people have been uprooted from their homes. An independent,

productive way of life has been stolen from them.

All of the above, not just this last item, are a consequence of an NIF government

agenda to impose a virulent fundamentalist ideology on an unwilling populace,

while a largely disinterested West watched.

Mr. Chairman, the role played by the NIF government in Sudan has been overwhelmingly

negative. I come to you today with an important message, however:

It is my view that Sudan is the one state sponsoring terrorism in today’s world

that holds realistic potential for fundamental change in the near-term. That change

is, in my view, achievable within this calendar year. It will be a change produced

by Sudanese themselves, without direct involvement of U.S. capacity. Since the

Sudan government is so clearly a player in the world of international terrorism, it

is distinctly in the interest of the United States to see such political change occur,

and to encourage it.

An extraordinary but true story that has not received attention in the American

press summarizes the audacious lack of scruples exhibited of the Sudan regime both

toward the United States as well as toward peace efforts inside Sudan. On April

20, Sudan government war planes bombed the strategic town of Yei in south Sudan

while four U.S. Secret Service personnel were on the ground there preparing for the

arrival of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. President Carter was scheduled to

visit Yei in an attempt to encourage Dr. John Garang, Commander-in-Chief of the

SPLA, to force a ‘‘peace accord’’ with the Sudan government. The Sudan government

knew of Carter’s mission.

Why did the Khartoum regime commit this depraved act? The government of

Sudan is aware that its survival is now in question. I can only speculate that, in

its desperation, the NIF government intended its bombs to kill Dr. Garang, and

thereby decapitate armed opposition to the government, even at the risk of injuring

or killing former President Carter. This outrageous act reveals the Sudan government’s

incorrigible mindset: the intention of President Carter was to seek an end

to the war; the government response was to bomb.

Let’s put this in its full perspective. To the best of my knowledge, the last time

a high foreign official seriously threatened violence against a former American

President was in April 1993, when Iraq’s Saddam Hussein planned to kill former

President George Bush in Kuwait. Our government bombed Iraq in response.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that the primary focus of this hearing is the export

of terrorism by Sudan’s National Islamic Front rulers. The U.S. government has

placed Sudan on the list of countries that sponsor international terrorism.

In my testimony, I would like to establish an important link—too easily overlooked

here in Washington—between the international terrorism practiced by the

Sudan government, and the terrorism it perpetrates against its own people, as well

as against its immediate neighbors in Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. It is my belief

that the NIF regime’s levels of terrorism—international, regional, and domestic—

are closely intertwined. They emanate from the same font of ideological extremism,

the same sense of impunity, and the same disdain for international law and humanitarian

principles at home and abroad. Sudan’s international terrorism starts at

home.

It is my conclusion that the most effective way to counteract and ultimately end

the NIF’s terrorism abroad is to react aggressively to its domestic terrorism. We

should support in nonlethal ways the Sudan government’s opposition and victims.

That will hit the NIF where it hurts. The international community’s persistent failure

to respond forcefully to the Sudanese government’s internal terrorism during

the last eight years has, in my view, reinforced the NIF’s notion of invulnerability

and has perpetuated the regime’s willingness to continue terrorist acts regionally

and internationally.

Fortunately, the tide of events inside Sudan has turned decisively against the government

of Sudan in the last year. This presents the United States and the world

with a real opportunity to see progress on the anti-terrorism front.

Years of Domestic Terrorism

As director of USCR, I have been a close observer and often an eyewitness of

events in Sudan for 16 years. I first traveled to Sudan in 1981 and have conducted

multiple visits to southern Sudan almost annually on behalf of USCR since 1988.

On June 30, 1989, an extremist government came to power by military coup in

order to prevent peace in Sudan. In the process, it overthrew a democratically elected

government. It came into power with the mission to Islamicize and ‘‘Arabize’’

Sudan and the entire continent of Africa. In this endeavor, it has forged strong links

with Libya, Iran, and Iraq, with violent extremists in Algeria and elsewhere, and

depended on a constant supply of Chinese arms.

Sudan’s terrorism against its own people is all too clear. In eight previous congressional

hearings on Sudan at which I have testified since 1989, I have depicted

the Sudan government’s program of famine, human rights abuses, massive population

displacement, and other scenes of destruction against its internal opposition.

Consider the parallels between the Sudan government’s international terrorism

and its domestic pogroms:

· Internationally, Sudanese officials were allegedly linked to plans to bomb

prominent buildings in New York City. Domestically, Sudanese military planes

have regularly bombed international relief operations as well as clearly marked

sites where needy southern Sudanese civilians have congregated for assistance.

· Internationally, the 1995 assassination attempt against Egyptian president

Hosni Mubarak received support from the NIF regime, according to investigators.

It created an international uproar. Domestically, more than 1.3 million

southern Sudanese have died since 1983 as a direct result of civil war and a

range of repressive policies perpetrated by the Sudanese government. This massive

death toll—twice as large as previous estimates—has been carefully documented

in a 1993 USCR study, ‘‘Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan.’’

· Internationally, the U.S. government cites alleged Sudanese government support

and training for terrorist groups such as Abu Nidal, Hezbollah, and

Hamas. Domestically, the same NIF regime has provided arms and training to

local ethnic militia that have attacked camps of defenseless displaced persons

in southern Sudan. These government-backed militia have perpetrated egregious

human rights abuses over the years. I have seen the corpses and destroyed

villages with my own eyes.

· Internationally, the Sudan government regularly denies that it harbors terrorists.

Sudanese officials use the same bald-faced stonewalling in an effort to hide

their transgressions at home. The Khartoum regime has regularly denied international

relief organizations access to populations needing emergency assistance

in the south and west. Sudanese officials have expelled the International Committee

of the Red Cross on a number of occasions, once for more than a year.

In other words, the lethal tactics that Sudan’s leaders apparently use to threaten

the United States and the rest of the world through terrorism echo the ruthless tactics

Sudan’s leaders use daily to wreak havoc on their own people.

The government of Sudan has consistently impeded international efforts to provide

humanitarian relief to needy Sudanese civilians. In my testimony to Congress

in past years, I have joined with other congressional witnesses to urge innovative

relief strategies by the international humanitarian community and have pressed

U.S. officials in public and private to make Sudan a high foreign policy priority. I

have tried to emphasize that Sudanese government policies deliberately target

southern Sudanese citizens for violence and displacement. Even in the capital,

Khartoum, in plain view of international diplomats, NIF policies of forcible relocation

have attempted to push three quarters of a million persons out of the city into

destitute locations.

The Sudan government consistently views many of its own citizens as ‘‘the

enemy.’’ Sudanese have suffered immensely from the NIF’s terrorism against its

own people. In our annual written reports, USCR has documented the dramatic increase

in refugees and internal displacement. In 1985—four years before the NIF

seized power—USCR reported that some 70,000 Sudanese were refugees due to Sudan’s

civil war. In 1990—one year after the NIF seized control—USCR reported that

the number of Sudanese refugees had risen to a half-million, plus some 4 million

or more internally displaced and war-affected persons. By 1995, the number of uprooted

Sudanese remained approximately 4.5 million, according to USCR estimates.

The Regional Threat

Mr. Chairman, in your review of Sudan’s international terrorism, I urge you to

consider the destabilization it has inflicted on its own neighbors. The government

of Sudan has been actively engaged in undermining secular, pro-American governments

in the Horn of Africa.

Eritrea

Reports indicate that the NIF regime has been assisting at least two Eritrean

rebel groups: The Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the Eritrean Liberation Front

(ELF), led by Abdalla Idris. The NIF reportedly provides material support and facilities

for training to the EIJ. In late 1994, Eritrean government forces killed dozens

of Sudanese-backed Jihad militants inside Eritrea, and captured several others. The

Sudan-based Jihad is believed responsible for placing dozens of landmines and for

conducting terrorist attacks inside Eritrea since late 1996.

Eritrea severed diplomatic relations with Sudan and invited Sudanese opposition

groups to establish offices in Asmara, the Eritrean capital, in retaliation for the

NIF’s hostile actions. Sudanese officials point to Eritrea’s support for a new coalition

of Sudanese groups mounting an armed resistance to the Khartoum regime and

criticizes the Eritrean government for handing over the Sudanese embassy building

in Asmara to Sudanese opposition groups.

Ethiopia

Khartoum is also providing support to several Ethiopian opposition groups, according

to press reports and sources in the region. The NIF regime provides financial

and material support to the Islamic fundamentalist group, el-Itahad and to the

Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). The Somalia/Ethiopia-based el-

Itahad has claimed responsibility for terrorist hotel bombings in the Ethiopian capital

last year. El-Itahad is also responsible for the attempted assassination of the

Ethiopian Transportation and Communications Minister last year. El-Itahad bases

along the Ethiopia-Somalia border are being used by international terrorists as safe

haven.

In response to these provocations, Ethiopian forces took pre-emptive measures inside

Somalia, attacking these training camps twice last year. The attacks captured

many el-Itahad members, as well as members of extremist groups from the Middle

East.

Uganda

A bizarre extremist ‘‘Christian’’ group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), operating

out of southern Sudan with the support of the Sudanese army, has terrorized

innocent civilians in northern Uganda for several years. The NIF government arms,

trains, and protects the LRA and other anti-Ugandan government groups in an effort

to oust the government of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, viewed as pro-

American by the NIF regime. The situation in northern Uganda is increasingly unstable,

and there is concern for widespread instability in the country. The United

States has declared northern Uganda a ‘‘disaster zone.’’

The Sudan government also backs the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), an armed

group operating along the Zaire-Uganda border to destabilize Uganda. A third

Ugandan rebel group, a shadowy group known as the Allied Democratic Forces, also

operates from Zaire and has raided southern Uganda in recent months. Some analysts

have alleged that this third rebel group has received backing from the Sudan

government.

Sudan’s NIF regime and some observers have maintained that the Ugandan government

supports the SPLA in southern Sudan and allows use of Ugandan territory

for military purposes.

Mr. Chairman, too often outsiders assume that instability and violence in this region

of Africa are endemic, as if they were part of the natural disorder. In fact,

many of these insurgencies appear to have a guiding hand stretching back to the

NIF regime in Khartoum.

Current Military/Political Situation

The virulent and expansionist extremism of the NIF government has caused

northern oppositionists and the SPLA to collaborate in seeking the government’s

ouster under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The emergence

of the NDA is critical because it defuses the NIF government’s major rallying

cry: that Islam in Sudan is under attack by secularists and the West. The northern

opposition forces are all Muslim and include the traditional and very conservative

Islamic leadership, which claims the loyalties of much of Sudan’s Muslim population.

In January 1997, the NDA launched a military offensive in territory far more

strategic to Khartoum than the south. This initiative—the ‘‘Eastern Front’’—has the

potential for shutting down Khartoum’s vital pipeline and corridor to the sea. Combined

with NDA military fronts in Sudan’s Upper Nile and Blue Nile provinces

(threatening a dam that supplies 80 percent of Sudan’s electrical power), SPLA

rebel activity in central Sudan’s Nuba Mountains region, and a strong SPLA offensive in the south generally, the NIF government finds itself confronted by a major

strategic dilemma. For the first time, the government faces military challenges on

four fronts. Never in its existence has it confronted such a direct threat to its own

survival.

In the past two weeks, I have conducted a site visit to southern Sudan along the

Uganda and Zaire borders, where the SPLA launched an offensive in March. Based

on what I saw and interviews I conducted on the ground, it is clear that the government

has suffered major losses from north of Yei to the border. Prior to March, government

forces were stationed at garrisons spaced every five miles or so, coupled

with so-called ‘‘peace villages’’ that contained local civilians forced to live there in

part to serve as partial human shields for government troops. Since March, a halfdozen

of the government troop garrisons have been overrun by the SPLA, along with

all the major towns near the border. I saw mountains of captured munitions, a destroyed

column of tanks and military vehicles stretching perhaps a mile-and-a-half,

tanks burned out, and towns such as Kaya with almost no building unscathed. The

headquarters of the Ugandan rebel West Nile Bank Front was one of the locations

captured by the SPLA.

I interviewed captured Sudan government soldiers, including a senior officer who

confirmed the great significance of the government’s losses. While I was meeting

with Dr. Garang on May 1, an incoming radio message stated that Rumbek had fallen.

Days later, the town of Tonj fell to the SPLA. In short, the SPLA is closing in

on Juba, the vitally important capital of southern Sudan, and is now only about

forty miles away.

During this site visit, I conducted long discussions with the SPLA leadership

about the future. Dr. Garang is more relaxed than I have ever seen him. He expects

that the combined capacity of the SPLA and its NDA colleagues will cause the government

to fall by autumn. I share the view that this is likely.

Current Humanitarian Situation

Mr. Chairman, you have indicated that you want this hearing to convey what terrorism

looks like up close, to convey the human faces of terrorism victims. During

my many trips to southern Sudan during the past 16 years, I have unfortunately

witnessed the results of the terrorism inflicted by the government of Sudan on its

own people: torched towns, empty fields, butchered corpses, terrified families. If you

or your colleagues ever care to see our archive of photos and videos, we can make

it available to you. It can be grisly viewing.

As I indicated earlier, more than 1.3 million southern Sudanese perished during

1983–93 due to the civil war and policies of Sudan’s government. This means that

at least one in five southern Sudanese have died of these causes. This may well be

a conservative estimate, because it does not include the 25,000 or more rebel soldiers

killed in combat, nor does it include relocated southerners who died in two

famines in northern Sudan. USCR’s research suggests that 80 percent of southern

Sudan’s estimated 5 million population have been displaced at some time during the

past 16 years. Southern Sudan was impoverished and isolated even before the civil

war. Humanitarian conditions have only grown worse under the NIF regime.

It is important to understand that innocent civilians are a primary target in this

war. This many people did not die accidently in ‘‘crossfires.’’ Rebels and government

forces alike have committed atrocities, to be sure, but there is no doubt that the

government bears the bulk of the responsibility. As a result of the war, many people

lack the land or dependable security to farm. During most years, malnutrition and

disease are pervasive, including measles, malaria, tuberculosis, and other afflictions.

The war and restrictive NIF policies have impeded relief efforts to many locations.

The regime uses food as a weapon. A senior Sudan official told me face-to-face in

late 1989—several months after the NIF came to power—that the government’s

would unabashedly manipulate relief programs to advance military strategy. They

have done exactly that.

The situation remains grim in many places, Mr. Chairman. But there is a change

that was evident in my recent site visit. Military successes by Sudanese rebels this

year have enabled up to 75,000 Sudanese refugees to repatriate from Uganda during

the past two months. Two major refugee sites in northern Uganda are now virtually

empty. About 120,000 refugees remain in Uganda at other locations, however, but

will repatriate if, as expected, the SPLA advance continues.

Many of the new returnees have been uprooted for eight years. Some have managed

to return to their homes, but many others have congregated at existing camps

for displaced Sudanese, where they hope to receive humanitarian assistance while

they assess security conditions in their home areas. Current food stocks operated

by the World Food Program (WFP) are dangerously low, however. In addition to the

returning refugees, some 2.1 million Sudanese require at least partial food assistance this year, according to WFP assessments. Relief workers have found malnutrition

rates as high as 26 percent in some areas of the south.

It is clear that food stocks in some locations such as Yei are virtually nonexistent.

People are surviving entirely on mangos, a supply that will pass.

As the tide of war has turned against them, officials of the NIF have reacted aggressively

against the local population and international relief efforts. Sudanese authorities

are placing new restrictions on aid deliveries by the UN-sponsored aid program,

Operation Lifeline Sudan. Aerial bombardments by government planes

against civilian targets in the south continue. A report in February by the UN

Human Rights Special Reporter for Sudan, Gaspar Biro, concluded that ‘‘all Sudanese

citizens living in areas controlled by the government of Sudan are potential

victims of human rights violations and abuses.’’ I share that view.

In the conflict area of northeast Sudan, the NIF has been accused of a ‘‘scorched

earth campaign’’ by international investigators, and 100,000 persons are newly displaced.

An estimated quarter-million southern Sudanese, many of them displaced,

remain crowded into the major southern town of Juba, including 10,000 new arrivals

since March. More than a million Sudanese have fled or migrated to neighboring

Egypt, according to some estimates, where many of them live in a pseudo-asylum.

Sudan’s terrorist activities are disquieting to the world community, but innocent

Sudanese themselves are paying the highest price for their regime. Humanitarian

conditions in much of Sudan are grotesque.

Recommendations

1. Establish a clear U.S. policy on Sudan that reflects U.S. interests and sides with

the people against a rogue government.

U.S. policy has not been clear. It has gradually evolved in a desirable direction,

in my view, largely because of the forceful efforts of the National Security Council

and the U.S. Congress. The U.S. government’s lack of political clarity confuses our

allies in the region. The United States seems disposed toward punishing Sudan for

its extremist behavior, yet the U.S. grants Khartoum an exception from our country’s

anti-terrorist legislation. The United States government officially welcomed the

so-called peace accord signed in April (among the Sudan government and several

minor rebel groups, not including the SPLA), yet U.S. officials generally recognize

that it is a pact among allies that the NIF government will exploit in its ongoing

efforts to divide and conquer the south.

It is in our interest, as well as the interests of the people of the Sudan, to see

a new, more moderate government in Sudan. This is an achievable goal the United

States should actively and unambiguously pursue.

2. Respond to the urgent humanitarian needs in south Sudan.

Partly due to the lack of policy clarity, U.S. humanitarian efforts to assist waraffected

Sudanese lack energy and creativity. The USAID/Sudan field office, based

in neighboring Kenya, typifies the problem. For example, thousands of Sudanese

refugees currently are returning to areas newly captured by the SPLA. Yet foodstuffs,

seeds, and agricultural tools are not available to them, undermining their

ability to survive until they can produce their first crops. The USAID/Sudan field

office will not allow food deliveries north of the town of Bazi. Therefore, returning

refugees congregate short of their homes, leaving them in limbo. The food situation

in the newly captured town of Yei is desperate—people will not survive there long

without quick food aid.

In addition, U.S. officials have allowed the NIF to undermine Operation Lifeline

Sudan (OLS), a unique initiative that made humanitarian history when first implemented

in 1989. OLS has become entirely subject to the whims and strategic interests

of the NIF government. The United States has recently taken only minimal

steps to contest the Sudan government’s strategic efforts to thwart relief deliveries

to civilians in areas under SPLA control.

3. Implement the development assistance language contained in the Committee report

on last year’s U.S. foreign operations appropriation legislation. The special language

attempted to give U.S. officials a ‘‘green light’’ to provide both relief and development

assistance to people in areas of Sudan outside the Sudan government’s control.

Specifically, in the section labeled ‘‘International Disaster Assistance,’’ the report

stated: ‘‘The committee encourages AID to utilize funds made available for nongovernmental

organizations operating in areas of southern Sudan outside government

control to include capacity building activities in additional to traditional relief

programs.’’

Under the heading, ‘‘Development Assistance,’’ the same report stated: ‘‘The committee

authorizes AID to use development and disaster assistance funds for capacity

building purposes in areas of southern Sudan outside the control of the government

of Sudan. The committee strongly encourages AID to make funds from these accounts

available to nongovernmental organizations for this purpose. The committee

expects that theses will not be used in areas controlled by southern factions that

have and continue to cooperate with the government of Sudan.

Simply put, the State Department has blocked implementation of this clearly stated

Congressional intent. In my view, the Congressional intent is exactly the policy

we should pursue.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the government of Sudan remains a terrorist threat

abroad, continues to destabilize its neighbors, and continues to perpetrate the worst

terrorism against its own citizens. Yet the Sudan government is more vulnerable

domestically than ever before.

If this Subcommittee, this Congress, and this U.S. government are truly dedicated

to ending the NIF regime’s terrorism abroad, the surest and most effective way to

accomplish that goal, in my view, is to support the actions of NIF opponents inside

Sudan. My just-concluded site visit to Sudan convinces me that the opportunity is

now.

Without professing to know all the resources, what

is clear is that the radical Islamic movement is well-financed. It

draws from a variety of Saudi and other financial resources; and,

while Sudan is one of the poorest countries of the world, it has

been able to purchase arms. Very often, those arms are financially

enabled by Iran or similar kinds of rogue States, usually, but not

always, purchased from the People’s Republic of China.

I can tell you from what I saw last week in the areas that were

captured by the SPLA the government certainly did not lack arms.

I am not a military person, but howitzers and canons of all varieties

were all over the place. T–55 tanks are all over the place,

many of them burned out as a result of the fight that occurred

there that I was able to witness, a whole column that was taken

out by the SPLA.

So I mean, they have these resources. They have the alliance

with fundamentalist elements in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and

they have governments like Iran that are willing to supply them.

These are petrodollars, recycled for killing Sudanese.